Verify the engine behind your result

New production human case runs, Workshop engine comparisons and the four machine operations use the same deterministic engine inside a pinned Azure confidential workload. Each completed engine result carries Microsoft-signed hardware-attestation evidence bound to its processed input, result and fresh challenge.

The edge verifies the workload before sending encrypted test content and checks each result’s attestation before delivery. If verification fails, the run fails instead of silently producing an unattested result.

Public trust material

• Current workload policy and archived public verification material
• Microsoft attestation verification keys in JWKS format
• Machine-readable trust discovery
• Microsoft’s current attestation signing keys
• Download the receipt verifier (Node.js 22 or newer)

The result-signing authority is Microsoft Azure Attestation. The workload policy pins the engine image and gateway verification key. The gateway’s private key is never published; its public key authorizes requests and does not create Microsoft signatures.

Verify a saved result

1. Export and retain the complete result JSON, including its attestation object. A copied hash or screenshot is insufficient.
2. Obtain the verifier and trust material from the trusted FAHCE publication. Save a trusted copy of the trust JSON to pin the expected workload, image and verification keys.
3. Run node verify-fahce-receipt.mjs receipt.json trust.json. Without a trust file, the verifier retrieves the published trust material from this site.
4. Check the reported policy, image, issuance time and scope against the release you intended to trust. The verifier checks the Microsoft signature, exact result/input bindings, non-debuggable confidential policy, signed runtime data and receipt hash.

The verifier checks original issuance. Reading or downloading a saved receipt does not re-execute the engine or create a new attestation.

What this proof covers

Attestation proves the scoped deterministic computation and its bound result. It does not authenticate caller-supplied source evidence, prove factual truth, certify an external deployment or transfer, or grant permission to act. Human permissions, evidence custody, source acquisition, model-provider calls and workflow controls remain separate; configured model generation outside the workload is not attested as having run inside it.

Payment settlement and recovery credentials remain separate from engine-attestation evidence. A valid completed negative finding can be attested. Malformed requests, unavailable processing and transport failures do not establish a completed determination.

Human workspace · Machine operations · API schema · Service policies